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All cortical and thalamic levels of sensory processing are subject to powerful top-down influences,
the shaping of lower-level processes by more complex information. New findings on the diversity
of top-down interactions show that cortical areas function as adaptive processors, being subject
to attention, expectation, and perceptual task. Brain states are determined by the interactions
between multiple cortical areas and the modulation of intrinsic circuits by feedback connections.
In perceptual learning, both the encoding and recall of learned information involves a selection of
the appropriate inputs that convey information about the stimulus being discriminated. Disruption
of this interaction may lead to behavioral disorders, including schizophrenia.General Theoretical Framework
Though neuroscientists are beginning to establish how the
activation of cortical regions and the responses of cortical
neurons correlate with behaviors, the enduring mystery is
what is the nature of a brain state, the fundamental algo-
rithm, at the level of cortical circuitry, by which cognition
arises. To derive this algorithm, one must analyze brain
circuits in a behavioral context. The classical view of infor-
mation processing in the brain is based on a hierarchical
organization. In the visual system, pathways start from
the analysis of very simple, local attributes, and represen-
tation of visual information becomes progressively more
complex as one moves up the hierarchy. However, from
a computational point of view, it is unlikely that feedfor-
ward mechanisms alone can achieve flexible and invariant
pattern recognition in a complex and rapidly changing en-
vironment. Recent findings have changed radically the
view of the role, range, and functional diversity of top-
down interactions in the cortex. We have learned that
the function of any area of the cerebral cortex, including
that of primary visual cortex, is subject to top-down influ-
ences of attention, expectation, and perceptual task.
Internal representations of the world, acquired by experi-
ence, affect our brain’s strategy for analyzing visual
scenes. Vision is an active process, and the function of
any cortical area is not fixed—each area runs different
‘‘programs’’ according to context and to the current
perceptual requirements. Visual processing therefore in-
volves countercurrent streams of information flow, and
the operation of primary visual cortex involves an inter-
action between bottom-up information coming from the
retina and feedback connections coming from higher-
order cortical areas.
The general idea of top-down influence is that complex
information that is represented at higher stages of
processing influences simpler processes occurring at
antecedent stages. Whereas some of the earlier work onspatial attention—the most studied instance of top-
down modulation—suggested that significant influences
of attention are found only at high levels in the visual path-
way, it is becoming increasingly clear that even at the ear-
liest stages in cortical sensory processing the functional
properties of neurons are subject to influences of atten-
tion, as well as other forms of top-down modulation. The
view of the perceptual role of attention has gone beyond
the simplistic metaphor of attention acting as a ‘‘spotlight.’’
The notion of attention itself may be inadequate as a de-
scriptor of the full range of top-down influences that are
exerted. Top-down influences have been shown to oper-
ate over a large variety of categories, including features,
surfaces, objects, object categories, temporal context,
and virtually any other perceptual group. Furthermore,
the effect of top-down processing is not best represented
as that resulting from a spotlight. Instead, the effects can
be of many different kinds, not only augmenting or multi-
plying responses but also sharpening tuning curves, con-
trolling contextual influences, or acting as a modulator of
plasticity. One therefore has to either expand the definition
of attention or describe a range of top-down influences
that extend beyond the conventional use of the term.
The emerging evidence suggests that any cortical area
is an adaptive processor. Rather than performing a fixed
and stereotyped operation on input coming from the
retina, it makes different calculations according to the
immediate sensory and behavioral context. This moment-
by-moment functional switching is likely mediated by an
interaction between feedback connections from higher-
to lower-order cortical areas and intrinsic cortical circuits.
The role of top-down influences is then to set the cortex in
a specific working mode according to behavioral require-
ments that are updated dynamically. In effect, these
ideas reverse the central dogma of sensory processing,
with a flow of information from higher- to lower-order
cortical areas playing a role equal in importance to theNeuron 54, June 7, 2007 ª2007 Elsevier Inc. 677
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ReviewFigure 1. Gestalt Rules of Perceptual
Organization
Certain contours are perceptually linked as
a result of their geometric relationships.
(A) (Top) In this image, taken from the work of
Max Wertheimer (1938b), one naturally associ-
ates line segments A and C as belonging to
a common contour and dissociates segments
A and D into separate contours, since A and
C maintain the same orientation and curvature.
This is known as the principle of ‘‘good contin-
uation.’’ (Bottom) The linkage of line elements
can follow the organization of complex forms,
such as the components A and D of the sinu-
soidal figure.
(B) Similar rules apply to contour saliency,
where the relationships between line segments
(relative orientation, proximity) govern the abil-
ity of the contour to pop out from a background
of randomly oriented and positioned lines
(adapted from Field et al., 1993). The contour on the right, composed of similarly oriented consecutive line elements, pops out when embedded
in a background of randomly oriented and positioned lines. The contour on the left, where there is more change in the orientation of adjacent line
elements, does not pop out and requires an extended search process to find.feedforward pathways. The construction of a subjective
percept involves making the best sense of sensory inputs
based on a set of hypotheses or constraints derived by
prior knowledge and contextual influences. Conversely,
the top-down expectations and hypotheses are set by
feedforward information, the sensory evidence. Under
this view, there is no starting point for information flow.
Even the prefrontal cortex, arguably the highest-order
area in hierarchical views, can be set in different modes
depending on task requirements. A strictly linear hierarchy
would leave the highest levels without a source of top-
down influences, so is it reasonable to speak at all of
a starting point of information flow? Rather, in accordance
with other theories of brain function (Mackay, 1956;
Sporns et al., 1991; Mumford, 1992; Ullman, 1995, 1996;
Di Lollo et al., 2000; Roelfsema et al., 2000; Rowe et al.,
2002; Dehaene et al., 2003b; Lee and Mumford, 2003;
Deco and Rolls, 2004, 2005), we propose that perception
results from a reverberation (or resonance) between feed-
forward and top-down information. The ignition of such re-
verberation may differ in different contexts from an exter-
nal stimulus to an internal state. In this view, the brain goes
through a succession of brain states, with each state serv-
ing as the source of top-down influences for the subse-
quent state. In this dynamic process, task requirements
and hypothesis setting are updated by sensory evidence,
which in turn causes cortical areas to execute different
programs. We propose that this may have an important
role in learning and plasticity, postulating that perceptual
learning may involve linking the appropriate intrinsic
connections to the feedback signal associated with a par-
ticular task.
Here we will consider the kinds of information that may
be conveyed by top-down interactions. The higher-order
information may include learned, internal representations
of the shapes of objects and of the abstract syntax of ob-
ject relationships. It may also include information about
behavioral context, which would include attention, expec-678 Neuron 54, June 7, 2007 ª2007 Elsevier Inc.tation, and perceptual task. We will also discuss ideas
about how disruption of top-down influences, or discon-
nection of cortical interactions, may play a role in psy-
chiatric disorders such as schizophrenia.
Lessons from Vision: Gestalt Rules, Context,
Experience, and Top-Down Control
A classical view of top-down influences was given by the
Gestalt psychologists early in the 20th century. They em-
phasized that the perception of objects was not achieved
by an assembly of the parts of objects but rather that
perception was based on holistic patterns. This was
expressed most succinctly by Max Wertheimer, who ob-
served that ‘‘There are entities where the behavior of the
whole cannot be derived from its individual elements
nor from the way these elements fit together; rather the
opposite is true: the properties of any of the parts are
determined by the intrinsic structural laws of the whole’’
(Wertheimer, 1938b). This is illustrated in the principle of
‘‘good continuation,’’ where one tends to link line seg-
ments that are collinear and have similar orientation and
not those making an abrupt change in direction (Figure 1A).
This property is seen also in contour saliency, where con-
tours made of line segments that have a gradual change
in orientation tend to pop out from complex backgrounds,
in contrast to those with random jitter in the orientation in
their composite line segments (Figure 1B). The rule of
good continuation makes more tractable the problem of
how to link the elements of complex scenes into contours
belonging to particular objects and segmenting them from
the elements of the background.
One sees the rules of perceptual organization reflected
in the response properties of neurons in primary visual
cortex (V1). This is seen in the dependence of neuronal re-
sponse upon context and the nature of the receptive field.
A single oriented line segment will elicit a brisk response
from a neuron when the appropriately oriented line is
placed within a small part of visual space, that neuron’s
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plex background of randomly oriented and positioned line
elements, the neuron’s response is substantially inhibited.
If one shifts line elements from the background into align-
ment with the line within the receptive field, the neuron’s
response becomes greatly facilitated (Kapadia et al.,
1995, 1999; Li et al., 2006). In effect, the response of the
neuron is as dependent on the global characteristics of
the contour extending well outside the core of the neu-
ron’s receptive field as it is on the attributes of the line seg-
ment within the receptive field. This kind of effect is termed
a ‘‘contextual’’ influence. Contextual influences, exerted
on neuronal responses, have been implicated in a number
of perceptual functions, including contour integration,
surface segmentation, color constancy, and object mo-
tion. To what extent are these contextual influences
‘‘top-down’’ versus feedforward, and can one equate
these influences with feedback connections from higher-
to lower-order cortical areas, or are they derived from con-
nections that are intrinsic to the areas where they are
found?
The predominant view of cortical sensory processing is
that as one proceeds along the visual pathway from pri-
mary visual cortex at the occipital pole to higher-order vi-
sual areas in the temporal lobe, neurons become selective
to progressively more complex stimuli—‘‘complexifica-
tion.’’ Early areas are thought to analyze simple attributes,
such as orientation, direction of movement, or color, and
this analysis is limited to local features within a very re-
stricted window. Higher areas assemble the local stimulus
features into more complex shapes, and they integrate in-
formation over progressively larger parts of visual space.
But both anatomical and physiological evidence shows
that even at the earliest stages of cortical processing neu-
rons can integrate information over large areas and that
they can be endowed with selectivity for complex shapes.
The belief that a particular property comes from a single
source, however, is likely to be an oversimplification. The
expression of one input to a neuron may depend on the
state of activation of other inputs. The properties ex-
pressed by a given neuron or a given cortical area may
be a function of an interaction between different cortical
areas (McIntosh, 1999, 2000), and more specifically, be-
tween local circuits in an area and feedback and feedfor-
ward connections from other cortical areas.
Forms of Top-Down Control
Top-down influences are sometimes equated with atten-
tion, and attention is often thought of in terms of spatial at-
tention, the location of attentional focus. But spatial atten-
tion is just one of many forms of attentional influence, and
just about anything can be attended, including objects,
features (such as orientation or color), motor actions,
and time. Other top-down influences include perceptual
task, priming, expectation, and hypothesis testing. Pars-
ing the forms of top-down and attentional influence into
different categories is not straightforward, since there is
an overlap between them and some of the differencesmay be merely semantic. It is difficult, for example, to sep-
arate object expectation from object-oriented attention,
or perceptual task from feature-oriented attention. The
important thing to note is the amount of information car-
ried by top-down influences as a whole. They do not rep-
resent only a spatial coordinate, but the rich diversity of
one’s internal representations of object identity and task
sequencing.
Attention is also not an all-or-none phenomenon, but
can be graded in intensity. In fact, one of the difficulties
in studies on attention is to ensure that an unattended
stimulus is in fact unattended, because it is difficult to
drive attention to zero unless the task at the attended loca-
tion is highly demanding of attentional resources (Joseph
et al., 1997). Another reason why the attentional spotlight
is not the best metaphor is that attention has properties
that encompass attended objects. In a way, the focus of
attention fills the boundaries of the attended object and
is therefore referred to as object-oriented attention. Atten-
tion can also be directed toward a feature, such as color or
orientation, and as such is distributed across the visual
field. There are other potential forms of top-down control,
however. These include perceptual task, where the dis-
crimination or detection task that is performed at the
attended location affects the ways in which the visual
stimulus is processed. Expectation may also play a role,
whereby internal representations of objects can influence
how scenes are segmented. This may represent a form of
hypothesis testing, such that before objects are identified,
the visual system compares stored representations of ob-
ject forms against bottom-up information on stimulus
characteristics. A dramatic demonstration of the specific-
ity of top-down influences is seen in priming. One can con-
struct an image containing an embedded figure that is
nearly impossible to interpret (Figure 2; Porter, 1954). If
one briefly views a more fully rendered version of the im-
age (Figure 3) and then views the initial, ambiguous ver-
sion of the same image, the figure becomes immediately
apparent. Thus expectation of a particular figure contrib-
utes to figure/ground segregation. The role of object ex-
pectation is also seen in the classic vase/face ambiguous
figure, which can be consciously shifted from one object
percept to another (Rubin, 1915). Computational models
of scene segmentation that utilize top-down representa-
tion of object shape work much better than segmentation
models that rely on bottom-up mechanisms (Ullman,
1995; Deco and Rolls, 2004, 2005).
Several lines of evidence support the idea that attention
can be directed to an entire object (for reviews see Driver
and Baylis, 1998; Scholl et al., 2001). Two judgments that
concern the same object can be made simultaneously
without loss of accuracy, whereas two judgments that
concern different objects cannot (Duncan, 1984). More-
over, it is easer to divide attention between elements of
the same, rather than different, perceptual groups (Baylis
and Driver, 1993; Egly et al., 1994; Watson and Kramer,
1999; Lamy and Egeth, 2002). One demonstration of
coherent-motion-defined object-oriented attention isNeuron 54, June 7, 2007 ª2007 Elsevier Inc. 679
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ReviewFigure 2. Priming Perceptions of
Embedded Figures
The segmentation of this black & white image
into object and background is extremely diffi-
cult. It is made much easier when the viewer
is primed with a more fully rendered version
of the figure—see Figure 3. Therefore, the
intermediate-level process of scene segmen-
tation is aided by high-level internal represen-
tations of object forms. From Porter (1954).obtained at the surface segmentation level. Two overlap-
ping patterns of dots rotating in opposite directions yield
the percept of two superimposed transparent surfaces.
Attending to one set of dots impairs subjects’ ability to
make judgments about the other set. Since the two sets
of dots are overlapping, the cueing effect cannot be ex-
plained by spatial attention (Valdes-Sosa et al., 1998,
2000; Rodriguez et al., 2002). This is true even when the
color of the two moving surfaces is identical, implying
that attention is not directed to space or color, but rather
to the whole surface (Mitchell et al., 2003). When the two
surfaces are presented in a rapid succession, following
a classical attentional blink paradigm, perception of the
first surface severely limits the ability to perceive the sec-
ond (Pinilla et al., 2001). Finally, it has been shown that
when the two surfaces are presented in binocular rivalry,
directing attention to one of the surfaces enhances its sa-
liency and access to conscious perception (Mitchell et al.,
2004), thus indicating that object-based attention acts as
a modulator to conscious selection. Object-level attention
modulation of performance has been studied in other
forms of bistable perception, showing attentional control
over ambiguous figure reversal (Liebert and Burk, 1985;
Peterson, 1986; Gomez et al., 1995; Toppino, 2003).
Neuropsychological evidence also shows that percep-
tual groups define units of attentional selection. For exam-
ple, in neglect (considered a landmark of spatial attention,
since it normally impairs patients from seeing a portion of
the visual field), the boundary between the attended and
neglected visual field locations can be determined by
the midline of an attended object, as opposed to the visual
field midline (Driver et al., 1994; Tipper and Behrmann,
1996; Behrmann and Plaut, 2001). Also, it has been shown
that spatial extinction in a parietally damaged patient was
less severe when bilateral stimuli formed a common sur-
face, even if this required visual filling-in to yield illusory
Kanizsa figures or completion of partially occluded figures
(Mattingley et al., 1997). These two examples, however,
have a somewhat ambiguous interpretation. It can be
argued that spatial selection is the dominant mechanism680 Neuron 54, June 7, 2007 ª2007 Elsevier Inc.of top-down control and that the object merely defines
the region in space to which attention has to be directed.
Additional evidence that spatial attention cannot ac-
count for all forms of top-down control comes from exper-
iments in which simultaneous attention to multiple object
features (beyond form or spatial extent) are studied. An
object can be defined as a cluster of features, grouping el-
ements of different dimensions: color, space, orientation,
and so on. In this description, an object evolving in time
(moving, deforming, rotating.) can be seen as a trajectory
in feature space. An important demonstration of object-di-
rected attention involves experiments in which subjects
are asked to track an evolving object, changing in three
different feature dimensions: color, space, and spatial fre-
quency. Attending to a feature of an object enhances
one’s ability to discriminate its other features (Blaser
et al., 2000), thus showing that performance enhancement
transfers to judgments of multiple dimensions of the same
object.
An important effort has been devoted to understanding
what subsets of feature space may be grouped as an ob-
ject and how this relates to perceptual groups that may be
attended. The Gestalt psychologists established a series
of fundamental principles that govern perceptual grouping
(Wertheimer, 1938a). However, gestaltian principles do
not fully account for the elements in feature space to
which attention can be guided (Scholl et al., 2001). Group-
ing operations depend on the identification of objects and
object parts, which may vary on many geometric and se-
mantic factors (i.e., a door may be a whole object made of
pieces, or a part of a house made of door, windows,
etc.). The versatile and intrinsically dynamic nature of
grouping operations is demonstrated by the Marroquin
pattern (Marroquin, 1976; Marr, 1982) illustrated in Fig-
ure 4. When attending to an invariant static pattern, circu-
lar shapes appear and vanish dynamically at various loca-
tions. Following Kofka (Kofka, 1935), Palmer and Rock
(1994) proposed a scheme for perceptual organization
that incorporates the Gestaltian principles of grouping,
based on hierarchies of objects and object parts. A first
Neuron
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uniformly connected (UC) visual properties, such as lumi-
nance, color, or texture. These regions, in turn, can be
parsed into branches whose borders are defined by con-
cave discontinuities of edges (Marr and Nishihara, 1978;
Hoffman and Singh, 1997; Barenholtz et al., 2003; Feld-
man, 2003; Feldman and Singh, 2005, 2006). A series of
experiments have shown that attention can be driven to
single-UC regions (Baylis and Driver, 1995; Watson and
Kramer, 1999; Lamy and Egeth, 2002). In an experiment
in which object-geometric dimensions (the concavities
breaking an object in distinct UC regions) as well as top-
down expectation (through priming or explicit instructions)
were manipulated, it was shown that attention can be
driven to different representational levels in the object
hierarchy, including a single UC, a set of UCs, or the whole
object (Watson and Kramer, 1999).
Thus, based on explicit instructions or previous knowl-
edge, attention can be directed to parts or the whole of
an object. Presenting large letters composed of smaller
letters to subjects, Ward demonstrated that switching
attention from parts to wholes is a slow process (on the
order of seconds) (Navon, 1977; Ward, 1982). In a more re-
cent experiment, attempting to link previous results, it has
been proposed that the whole-object-attentional effect is
manifested in tasks that require multiple responses with
focal attention. It is presumed that the attentional jumps
between parts of an object are easier than attentional
jumps across objects (Lamy and Egeth, 2002). In a modi-
fied version of the MOT paradigm described before, in
which subjects track moving objects, it was shown that
if target-distractor pairs are merged by connecting links,
performance was severely diminished. This indicated
that attending to multiple elements becomes more difficult
when they belong to distinct objects (Watson and Kramer,
1999; Scholl et al., 2001). While all previous examples
have been confined to two-dimensional images, very sim-
ilar results are obtained in 3D, where the main result is that
attention is deployed in a seemingly automatic manner to
surfaces (He and Nakayama, 1995), a natural extension of
the uniformly connected regions described previously.
Attention can act at a number of levels and can be
applied to a large family of cognitive processes (Miller,
2000). Attention can be directed toward actions, resulting
in an increased activity in prefrontal, premotor, and parie-
tal cortex, compared with unattended performance of the
same movements (Jueptner et al., 1997; Rowe et al.,
2002). Attention can be directed to time, and the degree
of attention paid to an object or situation modulates its
subjective duration (Hicks et al., 1976; Macar et al.,
1994). In a judgment task, attentional modulation was
tested by changing the content of the task from a color
to a temporal judgment while the stimulus remained con-
stant (a series of colored disks presented at different dura-
tions). It was found that area V4 was the only region that
was more active when attention was deployed to color,
while an extended corticostriatal network, most promi-
nently in the preSMA, was more active when attentionwas deployed to time. Thus, the network involved in the
attentional modulation to time overlaps with the network
involved in attention to movement. Attention can also be
driven to specific task configurations relating sensory in-
formation to motor actions, as reflected in task-switching
paradigms, where reaction times and error rates increase
when subjects change between different task configura-
tions (Allport et al., 1994; Sigman and Dehaene, 2006).
While this indicates that attentional control can be
driven in an endogenous and voluntary fashion to a variety
of cognitive processes, it has been known since the early
work of Posner (Posner, 1980) that attention can also be
engaged by exogenous factors. These two systems of de-
ployment of attention interact in a nontrivial fashion and
under many circumstances, a phenomenon of ‘‘attentional
contagion,’’ i.e., shifting between different forms of atten-
tion can be observed. For instance, the abrupt onset of
a task-irrelevant distractor induces the spread of attention
to an object at the same location (Yantis and Jonides,
1984; Remington et al., 1992; Yantis, 1993). This appears
to be a very general observation and has been interpreted
evolutionarily as a hard-wired system tuned for the detec-
tion of new objects (Yantis and Hillstrom, 1994), although
the automatic shift of attention may be inhibited when at-
tention is focused in advance on another location in the
scene (Yantis and Jonides, 1990; Theeuwes, 1991). An-
other transformation of attention is observed in the motor
domain. Selective attention shapes motor control, deter-
mining which of the various objects in the visual field is
to be the target used to plan and guide movement, as
for instance in the planning of saccades (Kowler et al.,
1995). Similarly, motor action automatically deploys visual
attention, indicating a tight coupling between attention (as
manifested in selection-for-perception) and selection of
a motor plan, including saccades (Deubel and Schneider,
1996) and also manual reaching (Deubel et al., 1998).
Another form of top-down control relating perception
and action involves a concept known as ‘‘efference
copy’’ or ‘‘corollary discharge’’ (Sperry, 1950). The classic
example of efference copy relates to the perceptual stabil-
ity of the world when one is executing eye movements. We
are able to distinguish between the movement of the visual
scene across the retina that is induced by eye movements
from that caused by actual object movement. In the for-
mer, objects still appear to be stationary, in the latter, ob-
jects appear to move, even though the sensory input may
be the same. This is presumed to be due to a ‘‘copy’’ of the
signal that is sent to the oculomotor system to move the
eye also being sent to the sensory pathways to cancel
the movement signal. The origin of this signal has been
suggested to involve a pathway from the superior collicu-
lus to the mediodorsal thalamus to the frontal eye fields
(Sommer and Wurtz, 2004). The role for motor and propri-
oceptive signals in modifying receptive fields includes
maintaining a stable representation of object position in
extrapersonal space during eye, head, and body move-
ments. In area LIP, neurons transiently shift their receptive
fields before a saccadic eye movement, responding toNeuron 54, June 7, 2007 ª2007 Elsevier Inc. 681
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Ability to Segment and Recognize the
Form Shown in Figure 2stimuli that will be brought into their receptive fields as a re-
sult of the saccade (Duhamel et al., 1992). The value of this
transient shifting of receptive fields is thought to be ob-
taining a predictive map of the visual world that will exist
after the eye movement. This phenomenon of shifting
receptive fields has potential utility in another way, by in-
creasing the amount of cortical territory dedicated to at-
tended parts of the visual field, or magnification factor,
as has been reported for area MT (Womelsdorf et al., 2006).
To an extent, some forms of top-down influences may
be equivalent. A shape-discrimination task may be the
same as object-oriented attention, since the attention
would have to encompass the form of the attended
shapes. But the key issue is how much information is con-
Figure 4. Object-Oriented Attention Seen in the Marroquin
Figure (Marroquin, 1976)
As one views this textured pattern, different shapes appear, showing
the ability of attention to be object directed. One alternately perceives
circles of different size.682 Neuron 54, June 7, 2007 ª2007 Elsevier Inc.veyed by the top-down signal and how much information
is returned by the lower stages as a result. There is consid-
erably more information, for example, in an instruction to
discriminate a square from a triangle at an attended loca-
tion than merely to attend to that location. The change in
response properties at the earlier stage resulting from
the top-down signal can also be quantified in terms of in-
formation—how well the response of the neuron is predic-
tive of the attribute being discriminated. The nature of the
effect of top-down influences on response properties has
been characterized in various ways. Some experiments
show that attention facilitates responses to stimuli lying
within the receptive field. These studies describe the at-
tentional influence as being a ‘‘gain-control’’ or a change
in response equivalent to that elicited by increasing stim-
ulus contrast (Treue and Martinez Trujillo, 1999; Reynolds
et al., 2000; Williford and Maunsell, 2006). A related model
of attentional influence is one of competition, where two
stimuli within the receptive field compete for determining
the cell’s response, and this competition is won out by
which of these stimuli are attended. But this view may
only reveal the tip of the iceberg of attentional effects.
Another view is how attention plays a role in mediating
contextual influences. In areas where attention to a single,
isolated stimulus does not alter neuronal responses, con-
textual interactions, the influence of stimuli surrounding
a central line element, can be dramatically altered by
top-down influences. Depending on the nature of the
task, attention can either serve to bind stimulus elements
inside and outside the receptive field or segregate them
(Ito and Gilbert, 1999; Li et al., 2006).
Extending this idea, we propose that there is not
a unique answer to the question of what is the unit of atten-
tional selection, but rather this may depend on the type of
stimulus representation used in performing a given task
and the specific actions involved. It has been shown, for
example, that selection may be object based when
a task requires shape judgments and space based when
position constitutes the relevant dimension of the task
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particular experiment (see, for example, Kramer et al.,
1997), other experiments have shown that the allocation
of attention mimics the requirements of the task (Ito
et al., 1998; Ito and Gilbert, 1999; Watson and Kramer,
1999; Lamy and Egeth, 2002). Thus, under top-down con-
trol, a large variety of perceptual categories (space, fea-
tures, parts, objects) can be attended (Yantis, 1992). How-
ever, there seems to be a specific mechanism of
spontaneous direction of attention. To resolve its certainly
difficult characterization, spontaneous direction of atten-
tion has been often referred to as the form of attention
that seem impossible to avoid (as in pop-out, for example)
(Schneider and Shiffrin, 1977). Essentially, the default
mode of attention seems to be directed to uniformly con-
nected perceptual groups, such as Gestalt bound percep-
tual groups, or surfaces (He and Nakayama, 1995; Driver
and Baylis, 1998; Scholl et al., 2001). The spontaneous at-
tention to basic perceptual groups, determined by geo-
metric or feature continuity, seems to follow the ontogeny
of object identification (Kovacs, 2000; Carey and Xu,
2001). The initial structures used for scene categorization
during early cognitive development are uniformly con-
nected groups. As adults, we direct attention to the struc-
tures we first learned. This suggests that spontaneous al-
location of attention is directed to overlearned structures
repeatedly present in the ensemble of sensory stimuli
throughout our early lives (Gilbert et al., 2001; Sigman
and Gilbert, 2000; Sigman et al., 2001).
In summary, attention can be directed to a large variety
of perceptual groups. The nature of this selection is deter-
mined by two critical factors: bottom-up geometric fac-
tors, as determined by Gestalt principles of continuity,
and top-down factors, which can be directed by previous
experience (priming), explicit semantic instruction, con-
text, or task necessities. Thus, the ‘‘units of attention’’
are intrinsically related to the rules of perceptual grouping
and their relation to action or representation as imposed
by a particular task or context. As we discuss below, these
rules are represented in bottom-up processes, but are en-
gaged by top-down control. In a similar manner to what
happens with perceptual learning, the phenomenology
of attention does not determine its own idiosyncrasy but
rather seems to be malleable to the context of the pro-
cesses and the task in which it participates. This, as will
be discussed later, may be critical to understanding the
neurophysiology of attention, which, we propose, is not lo-
cated within a particular area or groups of areas but rather
changes the workings of the specific areas involved in
each task.
Role of Top-Down Influences in Different Cortical
and Thalamic Areas
In investigating the strength and character of top-down in-
fluence in any cortical area, one must take into account
the functional role of that area. Stimuli that engage the
functional specialization of an area show much stronger
attentional influences than stimuli that are irrelevant tothat area’s function. This also relates to the interaction be-
tween contextual influences and top-down influences.
The size and prevalence of attentional effects conse-
quently depend on the nature of the visual stimulus and
on the behavioral paradigm. Some of the original reports
of attentional effects were reported for area V4, where
subjects were cued to attend to one of two or more dis-
crete stimuli in the receptive field (Moran and Desimone,
1985; Motter, 1994; Reynolds et al., 1999). Attention to di-
rection of motion has strong effects on direction-selective
neurons in area MT (Treue and Maunsell, 1996). In area V1,
if one presents an isolated, single bar or grating stimulus
within the receptive field, the responses of neurons
change very little when the animal attends to that bar ver-
sus attending to a different location, relative to that seen in
other visual areas (Haenny and Schiller, 1988; Motter,
1993; McAdams and Maunsell, 1999). But when the target
is presented within a larger and more complex context,
much larger attentional effects are seen (Motter, 1993;
Ito and Gilbert, 1999; Crist et al., 2001; Li and Gilbert,
2002; Li et al., 2006). The strongest effects are seen for
stimuli that invoke the higher-order, context-dependent
integrative properties of the area. Area V1, for example,
has been suggested to play a role in contour integration.
A stimulus consisting of a contour made of line elements
lying both within and outside the receptive field and em-
bedded within a complex background shows very strong
attentional effects, particularly when attention is engaged
in detecting the contour. The response of a neuron can be
doubled when the animal is doing a contour-detection
task at the receptive field location relative to when it is do-
ing a different task away from the receptive field (Li et al.,
2006). The salient finding of the studies on V1 is that atten-
tional effects are most strongly exerted on contextual in-
fluences. This principle is seen in feature-based attention,
where attention affects the effect of motion in a surround-
ing stimulus on the perceived motion of a central target
(Tzvetanov et al., 2006). The strength of attentional effects
is also dependent on the nature of the perceptual task—
different tasks performed at the same attended locations
elicit very different degrees of attentional modulation in
different cortical areas (Watanabe et al., 1998). Thus, the
idea that attentional effects get progressively stronger as
one moves up the visual pathway toward higher-order
areas—the attentional version of the idea of progressive
hierarchical complexification—seems to be biased by
specific experimental settings. With the appropriate visual
stimulus and behavioral task, one can see as strong atten-
tional effects in V1 as one sees in higher areas using other
stimuli and discrimination tasks. We therefore propose
that early visual areas are not inherently less susceptible
to top-down influences than higher areas. These influ-
ences may not even be specific to cortex, but wherever
one sees feedback connections, including thalamus
(O’Connor et al., 2002; Kastner et al., 2006). This study
showed even stronger attentional effects in the LGN than
in V1/V2. Top-down influences are not unexpected in the
LGN since it receives input from many more V1 neurons,Neuron 54, June 7, 2007 ª2007 Elsevier Inc. 683
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has been proposed that the effective size of this modula-
tion, which in this particular experiment are larger than
what is found in V1 and V2, might be related to the fact
that the LGN receives a larger amount of feedback inputs
than areas in early visual cortex, including projections
from the thalamoreticular nuclei. However, as we discuss
here, while there may be a bias on the amount of top-down
influences determined by anatomical factors, the range
and magnitude of top-down influences may depend dras-
tically on the computation required by a specific task.
Thus, it is difficult to determine an absolute estimation of
the magnitude of these interactions from a single experi-
ment.
Neural correlates of top-down influences are seen in
a number of perceptual tasks. In a curve-tracing task, cells
are more strongly activated when their receptive fields lie
along the curve being traced than when they are on un-
attended curves (Roelfsema et al., 1998, 2003). Another
example of task-dependent effects in V1 is seen in per-
ceptual ‘‘pop out’’ of shapes that differ in their shading
characteristics. The differential responses to these stimuli
are strongest when they are used by the animals in a de-
tection task (Lee et al., 2002). The fact that top-down influ-
ences extend well beyond the idea of an attentional spot-
light is seen in experiments on attention to feature, where
the modulation is dependent on the orientation or color (in
area V4) or direction of movement (in area MT) of a stimulus
for neurons tuned to the attended feature, regardless of
stimulus location (Motter, 1994; McAdams and Maunsell,
1999; Treue and Martinez Trujillo, 1999; see Treue, 2001,
for review).
Top-down influences may play a role in visual memory,
recruiting the same areas that are involved in processing
a visual stimulus in the recall of that stimulus. This has
been seen with fMRI, where activation in primary visual
cortex is reported in individuals who are imagining a visual
stimulus (Kosslyn, 1994; Roland and Gulyas, 1994; Buck-
ner and Wheeler, 2001; Slotnick et al., 2005). A particularly
intriguing example of cortical activation by visual memory
has recently been reported based on single-unit record-
ings in area MT of behaving monkeys. This area is ordinar-
ily activated only by moving stimuli, for example a patch of
moving dots, not by static shapes. However, when ani-
mals were trained to associate a static shape, an arrow,
with the moving dots, then the shape stimulus alone could
elicit responses in MT (Schlack and Albright, 2007). This
activation was interpreted as representing the recall of
the associated moving stimulus. Alternatively, one might
argue that the activation represents encoding novel infor-
mation about static stimuli in MT, which exhibits the func-
tion required to analyze those stimuli when the animals are
performing the task that is relevant to those stimuli. Either
explanation argues for a strong top-down influence in the
activation of this area.
Other evidence for a top-down interaction between the
representation of object shape and lower levels of visual
processing is seen in binocular rivalry. When the two684 Neuron 54, June 7, 2007 ª2007 Elsevier Inc.eyes are presented with different images, subjects per-
ceive an alternation between one image and the other.
The locus of this competition is a matter of considerable
controversy, with some arguing that it occurs only in
higher-order visual areas and others showing effects in
area V1 and even in the LGN (Logothetis et al., 1996;
Lumer et al., 1998; Tong et al., 1998; Polonsky et al.,
2000; Wunderlich et al., 2005). But the locus of the compe-
tition may depend partly on the kinds of stimuli used, such
that the use of gratings as the competing stimuli results in
a competition at early levels (Polonsky et al., 2000), while
houses and faces result in an extrastriate competition
(Tong et al., 1998). The nature of the competition suggests
that rivalry is not embedded in a single area but involves an
interaction between multiple areas. When two images are
cut up into a set of patches, with different parts of the two
images presented to either eye, the perceived alternation
occurs between the complete, assembled objects rather
than between the divided images seen by each eye,
e.g., the competition is object rather than explicitly eye ori-
ented (Figure 5; Kovacs et al., 1996; Lee and Blake, 2004).
For this to occur, it is necessary to combine information
about object identity as well as about eye of origin. But
while complex shapes are represented in higher-order
areas, eye specificity is represented in earlier visual areas.
The requirement for this experiment, then, is to select the
appropriate information coming from either eye to assem-
ble a unified object percept and to suppress the conflicting
information coming from the other locations in either eye.
One way this can be achieved is through a top-down inter-
action between the higher- and lower-order areas.
The other side of the issue of the cortical or thalamic tar-
gets of top-down influences is the sites of origin from
where these influences arise. The potential candidates in-
clude parietal areas, which represent saliency maps and
mediate shifts in the locus of attention, frontal areas, which
are involved in control of task execution, and temporal
areas, which contain internal representations of object
shapes and can therefore play a role in priming, expecta-
tion, and shape discrimination. These areas are highly in-
terconnected and are often simultaneously engaged
when executing perceptual tasks. There are multiple
routes, both direct and indirect, by which information in
these areas may influence processing in early sensory cor-
tex. For example, area V1 receives direct, though weak,
projections from inferotemporal cortex, but it also receives
strong projections from area V2 and V4, which in turn re-
ceive feedback from higher areas, including temporal
lobe. Therefore, feedback can be mediated via a cascade
of descending connections crossing many cortical areas.
The Brain Circuitry of Top-Down Influences
Starting from the idea that top-down effects involve an in-
teraction between behavioral states such as attention or
expectation and stimulus context, one can ask whether
this interaction occurs at higher-level areas, and the prod-
uct of the interaction fed back to early areas, or whether
this interaction occurs in the early areas themselves.
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interactions seen in early areas such as V1 are themselves
mediated by local connections versus feedback. With the
caveat that one cannot assume that all contextual interac-
tions come from the same source, there is evidence that
interactions involved in contour integration are mediated
at least in part by long-range horizontal connections
formed by cortical pyramidal cells within V1. These con-
nections enable their target neurons to integrate informa-
tion over an area of cortex representing an area of visual
space that is much larger than the receptive fields of neu-
rons (as defined by simple stimuli, such as a single ori-
ented line segment) (Gilbert and Wiesel, 1979; Stettler
et al., 2002). In support of this idea, the spatial extent
and orientation dependence of the horizontal connections
match the perceptual characteristics of contour saliency
(Li and Gilbert, 2002; Stettler et al., 2002; Li et al., 2006).
Another suggested route for contextual influences is feed-
back coming from higher-order cortical areas (Angelucci
et al., 2002; Shmuel et al., 2005), though we suggest
that the role for feedback is to provide behavioral context,
as opposed to stimulus context. Even though the long-
Figure 5. Top-Down Influences in Binocular Rivalry
The image of the monkey and the forest scene are cut and joined to
form two complementary images, each containing pieces of the two
images. When each composite image is shown to either eye, one
sees alternating percepts of either the monkey or forest scene, as
shown at top, rather than the jumbled images that are shown to either
eye. Therefore, the competition between the eyes is local and is gov-
erned by the global properties of the coherent scenes, which act in
a top-down matter to gate eye-specific information. This is thought
to be top-down, since the eye of origin information is present at lower
stages in the visual pathway, whereas the higher-order areas that rep-
resent the objects are binocular (Kovacs et al., 1996).range horizontal connections within V1 have properties
that are coincident with the perceptual characteristics of
contour saliency, the effectiveness of these connections
is under top-down control. The observation that re-
sponses in V1 neurons show a stronger relationship to
contour saliency when animals perform a contour-detec-
tion task suggests that the contour-related properties of
V1 neurons result from an interaction between feedback
and local circuits (Li et al., 2006).
It has traditionally been thought that timing of neuronal
responses can be used as a clue to understand the ana-
tomical and physiological basis of cortical interactions.
The underlying assumption is that influences coming
from higher-order areas would involve longer delays
from the onset of a cell’s response than influences arising
within the same cortical area (Lamme, 1995). However,
there are two fundamental problems with this assumption.
First, measurements of conduction velocity of cortical
feedback showed that it is faster than that of intrinsic con-
nections, leading some to expect that delayed influences
were indicative of input from local sources (Hupe et al.,
2001; Bair et al., 2003). A similar demonstration of ex-
tremely fast feedback influences comes from a TMS study
in humans (Pascual-Leone and Walsh, 2001). When
a pulse is applied in the V5/MT region in humans, it gener-
ates the impression of a moving set of light speckles. The
perception of the moving phosphene can be disrupted if
a second pulse is applied in area V1 at 5 and 40 ms after
the first pulse, but not when the pulse in V1 was applied
before the pulse in V5. This suggests that the pulse in V1
prevents proper transmission of information through feed-
back projections reaching V1 and that this feedback prop-
agation of information can be extremely fast. A second
fundamental difficulty with the use of timing to infer func-
tional and anatomical connectivity is that dissociation be-
tween timing of neural events and synaptic delays is found
in simple decision tasks. Neurons in the parietal cortex
integrate information of sensory stimulation, and this
accumulation process starts after a latency of about
200 ms (Gold and Shadlen, 2000). This latency cannot
be explained simply by synaptic delays, and it has been
proposed that the delay, which is relatively fixed for a given
task, may be related to the duration of an initial processing
stage that is required to engage a large-scale rever-
beration involving top-down interactions (Sigman and
Dehaene, 2005, 2006). Similarly, the rather long latencies,
beyond 100 ms, observed in some contextual influences
in monkeys (Lamme, 1995) and humans (Martinez et al.,
1999, 2001) are well out of the range of what one would
expect even from slow conduction velocities. Thus, it is
overly simplistic to suppose that a functional property
that appears with a delay in a response arises because
of slow conduction velocities. Rather, they may reflect
the time required for the network to settle into a state,
a process that can involve either intrinsic connections,
feedback, or both.
While some contextual influences have properties that
suggest a role of intrinsic horizontal connections in theirNeuron 54, June 7, 2007 ª2007 Elsevier Inc. 685
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attention suggests an interaction between feedback con-
nections to an area and local circuits within that area. The
Gestalt rules of perceptual completion were an early sug-
gested manifestation of top-down influences, though
there is disagreement concerning the relative role of feed-
back and intrinsic connections in generating these rules.
Here we emphasize, however, that in addition to sensory
context one needs to consider the pathways that convey
behavioral context, which includes attention, expectation,
perceptual task, and hypothesis testing.
The anatomical pathways that can carry top-down influ-
ences include numerous feedback connections from
higher- to lower-order visual areas. V1 receives strong
feedback connections from multiple visual areas, includ-
ing V2, V4, MT, and inferotemporal cortex. It has also
been suggested that top-down influences could be medi-
ated by a cortex-to-thalamus-to-cortex pathway (Sher-
man, 2005). In such a context of fully reciprocal connectiv-
ity, it is worth asking whether the terms ‘‘higher’’ and
‘‘lower’’ are appropriate at all. Indeed, as we pointed out
earlier, V1 is required for conscious perception even in
the absence of bottom-up information (i.e., when the stim-
ulus does not start in the retina). During imagery or mag-
netic stimulation, a stimulus can only become conscious
if V1 function is not disrupted. This has led to the proposal
that V1 and V2 may work as ‘‘active blackboards’’ that in-
tegrate and sustain the result of computations performed
in higher areas (Mumford, 1991; Hupe et al., 2001). But this
can only be a part of this story, and assuming that informa-
tion flow starts in higher-order areas that use V1 and V2 as
buffers may be as oversimplistic as a fully feedforward
scheme. Instead, in the most general situation, there is
a massive signaling between mutually connected cortical
regions, leading to reentry and reverberation (Sporns
et al., 1991). In this scheme, as has been proposed by
Mumford and colleagues, the best description of V1 is
not the first stage in a feedforward pipeline (or the last in
a fully top-down conception of brain function) but rather
the unique high-resolution buffer in the visual system for
geometric calculations (Mumford, 1991; Lee and Mum-
ford, 2003). Massive parallel reentry and signaling across
all cortical areas may lead potentially to an explosive com-
bination of possible neuronal states. It has been proposed
that this process is constrained by a selection system
based on a reward mechanism acting on different tempo-
ral scales, from the few hundred milliseconds of a single
trial to long-term learning (Sporns et al., 1991).
This broadly connected network can be triggered in dif-
ferent manners. Depending on the way in which expecta-
tion is triggered relative to stimulus onset, top-down influ-
ences may either be exhibited simultaneously with the
initial response to the stimulus or with some delay. For
example, when an animal is cued before the stimulus is
presented to perform either a three-line bisection task or
a vernier discrimination task, the difference in the re-
sponses associated with the two tasks begins from the
first spike. On the other hand, when performing a con-686 Neuron 54, June 7, 2007 ª2007 Elsevier Inc.tour-detection task where the location of the embedded
contour is unknown, the response associated with the
presence of a contour in the receptive field occurs with
a delay of100 ms (Figure 6; Li et al., 2004, 2006). This de-
lay in the modulation of the feedforward response is sim-
ilar to what has been found in other experimental manipu-
lations in which the triggering of attention is determined by
stimulus characteristics (Lamme, 1995; Roelfsema et al.,
1998). Another example is seen in area LIP, where the
component of neurons’ responses to a probe indicating
saccade plan occurs 115 ms after probe onset (Bisley
and Goldberg, 2006). When the stimulus itself is the cue
to determine where attention should be directed, the dif-
ferential response reflecting the attentional effects occurs
with a delay after stimulus onset. But the examples pre-
sented above are somewhat artificial circumstances, in
that we are normally under the influence of continuous ex-
pectations, rather than just a transient attentional state fol-
lowing a discrete stimulus appearance. Ordinarily one is
exposed to a constant stream of stimuli that are always
under the influence of a set of prior expectations, and
the responses of neurons in our visual cortices are never
purely sensory or bottom up. It has been proposed that
in this dynamic setup, two partially segregated networks
may play distinct roles. The first system includes the tem-
poroparietal cortex and inferior frontal cortex, which
works as a ‘‘circuit breaker’’ for the dorsal system, redi-
recting attention to salient and unexpected events. The
second system, including parts of the intraparietal cortex
and superior frontal cortex, is involved in preparing goal-
directed actions by exerting a specific pattern of top-
down influences (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002).
We have previously stated that top-down interactions
can be of many different kinds, not only augmenting or
multiplying responses but also sharpening tuning curves,
controlling contextual influences, or acting as a modulator
of plasticity. This leads to questions concerning a plausible
biophysical basis of top-down influences that may involve
an interaction between feedback connections and local
circuits. We have suggested that the task-dependent
changes in the functional properties of neurons involve
gating of horizontal inputs by feedback connections. Our
theory is that although a neuron may receive thousands
of inputs from intrinsic connections, only a small fraction
of these connections are expressed, or effective, under
any particular behavioral context. This allows neurons to
multiplex their function in a state-dependent manner, tak-
ing on different functional roles when the animal performs
different perceptual tasks. In this manner, rather than per-
forming a stereotyped operation on sensory input, each
cortical area is an ‘‘adaptive processor,’’ running different
algorithms under the instruction of feedback from higher-
order areas. In a way, this theory of neuronal function
mimics a well known concept in genetics and cell biology.
All cells in an organism contain the same genome and thus
potentially may perform identical operations. Yet, their
broad morphological and biochemical diversity and func-
tional repertoire is set by a specific pattern of gene
Neuron
ReviewFigure 6. Task-Specific Modulation of Visual Responses in Area V1
(Top) In this experiment, animals were trained to do either a three-line bisection task (A) or a vernier discrimination task (B) with the set of five lines. The
set of visual stimuli consisted of 25 conditions: five offsets of the parallel lines used in the three-line bisection task times five offsets of the collinear
lines used in the vernier discrimination task. From this set of stimuli, tuning curves were generated based on the neurons’ responses to the five offset
positions of the parallel or collinear lines. In the example shown (C), the neuron showed more modulation to the offset of the parallel lines when the
animal performed the three-line bisection task than when performing the vernier task. In this experiment, the animals were precued to the task before
the stimulus appeared. The difference in response when the animal performed the two tasks began from the very beginning of the response (D).
(Bottom) Effect of contour saliency on responses when animals perform a contour detection task. (E) Animals were trained to either detect a contour
in a complex background or to do a three-line bisection task in the hemifield opposite to the embedded contour. (F) As contours became more salient,
the response of neurons in V1 increased. This increase was more marked when the animal performed the contour-detection task than when they did
the bisection task. (G) This facilitation occurred with 100 ms delay after response onset (bottom right). Error bars represent ± SEM. (Adapted from
Li et al., 2004; Li et al., 2006.)Neuron 54, June 7, 2007 ª2007 Elsevier Inc. 687
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set in a slow temporal scale that determines basic struc-
tural aspects of the cell, i.e., its morphology, membrane
properties, etc.. Other aspects of the gene expression
pattern are regulated by context, determined through spe-
cific biochemical pathways, and allow changing, in a dy-
namic fashion, the operational mode of any given cell. A
homeostatic equilibrium is reached when this signaling
between cells (the same cells are vulnerable to context,
and then, the newly expressed genes set a new context
for the cells they signal) reaches a dynamically stable
configuration.
While this sets the functional and computational basis of
the workings of top-down influences, the biophysical
mechanisms by which neuronal circuits are set into differ-
ent states or programs remains largely unknown. An inter-
esting observation is the growing literature showing that
there are default brain ‘‘states,’’ with massive amounts
of spontaneous activity, perhaps much of it subthreshold,
occurring even in the absence of a sensory stimulus. Even
when the brain is ‘‘at rest,’’ broadly distributed networks of
correlated activity are active (Fox et al., 2005, 2006). It has
also been reported with optical imaging using voltage-
sensitive dyes, where it has been suggested that sponta-
neous regional fluctuations in activity are as large as the
activity evoked by a visual stimulus (Arieli et al., 1996; Pe-
tersen et al., 2003). The spontaneous fluctuations in brain
activity observed with fMRI and optical imaging have been
observed with intracellular recording as UP and DOWN
states: spontaneous depolarization and hyperpolariza-
tions in membrane potential that last for seconds (Stern
et al., 1997; Lampl et al., 1999; Cossart et al., 2003; Pe-
tersen et al., 2003; Haider et al., 2006). Although UP and
DOWN states have been shown to be more prominent in
sleep than in the awake state (Steriade et al., 2001), these
state changes have been seen in whisker barrel cortex of
awake mice, where up and down states exist, and the ki-
netics and magnitude of the membrane-potential shifts
change from periods of rest to periods of active whisking
(Crochet and Petersen, 2006). These distinct cortical de-
fault states can have profound influences on stimulus-
evoked activity, and thus, one is tempted to argue that
they may account for the presetting of cortical state by ex-
pectation or perceptual task. Perhaps related to this, cor-
tical areas show significant ‘‘baseline’’ activity in subjects
performing a pattern-detection task, even when the stim-
ulus is absent (Ress et al., 2000). While the link between
specific top-down influences and brain states is an intrigu-
ing idea, and while fMRI studies have related to a certain
extent the workings of one of these prior networks to
top-down modulation (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002),
some caveats remain. First, it will be valuable to demon-
strate a direct link between the different manifestations
(fMRI, optical imaging, intracellular recordings) of this
state alternation. Second, there is a need for evidence to
directly relate the dynamics of these state alternations to
a behavioral context, to specific engaging and disengag-
ing of top-down influences. Finally, one must determine688 Neuron 54, June 7, 2007 ª2007 Elsevier Inc.whether the binary nature of neuronal states can account
for the broad diversity of top-down influences.
Top-Down Influences and Perceptual Learning
A further insight into the biophysical basis of top-down in-
fluences comes from the relationship between top-down
influences and perceptual learning. Perceptual learning
refers to the unconscious improvement in stimulus dis-
crimination and detection that occurs after exposure to
the stimulus for an extended period of time. It has been
shown that perceptual learning in shape discrimination
or in search tasks involves an alteration in the functional
properties of neurons in early visual cortex (Crist et al.,
2001; Schoups et al., 2001; Li et al., 2004). The functional
change can involve a sharpening of orientation tuning of
V1 neurons in animals trained on an orientation-discrimi-
nation task (Schoups et al., 2001) and a change in contex-
tual influences in animals trained on a shape-discrimina-
tion task (Crist et al., 2001; Li et al., 2004). As shown in
Figure 6, the tuning of V1 neurons for the offset of parallel
lines changes when animals perform a three-line bisection
task, where the parallel lines are relevant to the task, rela-
tive to when the animals perform a vernier discrimination
task with the identical five-line stimulus (Crist et al.,
2001; Li et al., 2004). In the example shown, the cell carries
more information about the relative position of the three
parallel lines when the animal is doing a task that engages
those lines, and this differential tuning is seen for over half
of the neurons in V1. The critical point here, and where
top-down influences come into play, is that the functional
properties associated with learning of this perceptual dis-
crimination are only expressed when the subject is per-
forming the trained task. Notably, the top-down influence
here is not the gain control seen in other attentional stud-
ies, since the shape change in the tuning curve cannot be
accounted by a multiplicative change in responses.
Top-down influences are also evident in fMRI studies of
human subjects trained on a search task involving a target
embedded in an array of distractors. After practice on this
task, subjects become adept at determining whether the
target is present, and this is associated with a shift in the
representation of the trained target from higher to lower
retinotopically mapped visual cortical areas, as evidenced
by an increase in the activation in V1/V2 when subjects
search for the trained versus untrained targets (Sigman
and Gilbert, 2000; Gilbert et al., 2001). Here again top-
down interactions come into play: there is no difference
in activation when the subjects are searching for the
trained target when it is present and seen compared
with when it is absent. The change in activation with the
trained target, in this case, is primarily associated with
the act of searching for the target and not with the pres-
ence of the target. The idea here is that the effect of V1 ac-
tivation by training is the engagement of V1 in the task via
top-down influences.
Findings that the response properties of V1 neurons
change according to object expectation and perceptual
task contribute to the idea that neurons multiplex their
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ferent analyses according to the behavioral context.
Also, the changes induced during learning themselves re-
quire top-down influences, since one generally needs to
attend to the task or stimulus in order for its properties
to be encoded. Thus both the encoding and recall of the
learned information are subject to top-down influences.
The observation that top-down effects are most strongly
exerted on contextual influences suggests that learning
involves setting up the appropriate interaction between
feedback connections and the local circuits that provide
contextual information (such as the long-range horizontal
connections). This idea is represented schematically in
Figure 7. The idea that top-down influences involve a gat-
ing of local circuits by feedback suggests a novel mecha-
nism, at the level of circuitry, by which learning occurs.
The dominant theory of the synaptic mechanism for learn-
ing has been the Hebbian rule, where neurons that have
correlated firing will strengthen their mutual interaction,
potentiating the strength of synapses they form with
each other. The alternative idea that we propose is one
that involves changes in the interaction between neuronal
inputs. Here, particular ensembles of feedback connec-
tions selectively gate subsets of horizontal connections.
This requires one set of inputs to selectively address an-
other set of inputs allowing a small proportion of intrinsic
inputs to be expressed under any given behavioral con-
text. In this view, a given set of horizontal inputs modulate
a target cell’s responses in a way that enables the subject
to perform a particular discrimination task, thereby in-
creasing the amount of information carried in service of
that task. The requirement of that system is to identify
which subsets of inputs are useful for performing that
task and to have those inputs expressed when the subject
is doing the task. The process of learning, then, would in-
volve linking the appropriate intrinsic connections to the
feedback signal associated with a particular task, which
is what we refer to as the addressing process. Then,
whenever the feedback signal assumes that state, those
sets of intrinsic connections are expressed, and other
connections are suppressed. This process would not re-
quire modulation of synaptic weights, such as seen with
LTP and LTD, but it is possible that both synaptic modifi-
cation and changes in addressing would work coopera-
tively to encode learned information.
State Switching of Cortical Function
In one sense, the idea of cortex as adaptive processor,
whereby neuronal function is constantly changing, might
seem incompatible with the need to maintain a stable rep-
resentation of the sensory environment. The resolution to
this conundrum is that representations appear on an as-
needed basis. They never disappear and are present in
a latent form in synaptic weights of all the connections
within an area, but not all connections are enabled at all
times. The classic view of how neurons represent informa-
tion is one of the ‘‘labeled line.’’ A neuron’s firing is inter-
preted by subsequent processing stages as indicative ofthe presence of a stimulus endowed with a particular set
of attributes (orientation, color, etc.), and the relative re-
sponses of neurons with different line labels determine
how the stimulus is perceived. The idea of top-down-
mediated functional multiplexing suggests that a neuron’s
line label actually changes, and its response is appropri-
ately interpreted by the higher areas because these areas
sent the instruction of which function to perform, and the
areas receiving the top-down signal send a return signal
that is the result of that calculation. Second, it should be
pointed out that an area performing one function does
not wipe the slate entirely clean for performing other func-
tions. Rather, there is an enrichment of the information re-
lated to the immediate behavioral context, but there is still
some information carried by that area related to the other
functions it is capable of performing. The end result, how-
ever, is that the range of functions that an area is capable
Figure 7. Schematic Representation of Circuits Involved in
Top-Down Influences, with an Interaction between
Feedback and Local Circuits
An important unanswered question is the specific biophysical nature of
top-down connections and how this may relate to their broad range of
functional influences. The simplest form of an influence may be imple-
mented by a direct connection from neurons in higher cortical regions
to pyramidal neurons in V1. This model may explain the response
selection (‘‘spotlight’’) form of attentional influence, but top-down in-
fluences have been shown to target specifically contextual and inte-
grative properties of V1 neurons, suggesting a gating of subsets of
neuronal inputs. This requires an interaction between neural networks,
with, for example, feedback targeting inhibitory interneurons so as to
neutralize the action of intrinsic horizontal connections within V1.Neuron 54, June 7, 2007 ª2007 Elsevier Inc. 689
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see if neuronal properties were fixed. The effect of this is
that the representation of information is at the level of syn-
apses rather than cells, and since this involves several or-
ders of magnitude more elements, an individual cortical
area can serve many more functions.
An interesting observation related to the multiplexing
idea deals with the proportion of neurons in a cortical
area whose responses are related to a given task. One
can imagine two possible scenarios: either there is a com-
partmentalization of function, with small numbers of neu-
rons specializing in a given task, or a more distributed
function, with essentially all neurons carrying information
related to all the tasks the area performs. The growing
body of evidence points more toward the latter: whether
one looks at how neurons in V1 carry information related
to a three-line bisection task or how neurons in the frontal
lobe modulate their responses in a way related to execu-
tive control in a particular task, the proportion of neurons
involved always seem to be on the order of 50% (Miller,
2000; Li et al., 2004). And as the task is shifted, the set
of neurons involved are highly overlapping with those
engaged in the first task. If the other mode of representa-
tion, involving compartmentalization, had been involved,
one would have been confronted with a needle-in-the-
haystack problem, where it would be nearly impossible
to find the small proportion of neurons that encoded infor-
mation relevant to a particular task. The high proportion of
neurons involved in some experiments may reflect the
large amount of training the animals received in acquiring
the task and the dominance of that task in the animals’ ex-
perience during an extended period of data collection.
However, the point remains that neurons can multiplex
their functional roles, calling up different functional states
according to the immediate task demands.
The state-switching or multiplexing of a single neuron
(or neuronal ensemble) can occur dynamically within a sin-
gle task. This has been shown in a two-interval frequency
somatosensory discrimination task, which requires a se-
quence of computations: encoding the first frequency,
maintaining this value in memory, comparing it with the
second frequency, and establishing a binary (categorical)
decision (Machens et al., 2005). It has been shown that the
same neuron performs subsequently all these computa-
tions, suggesting that processing modules can ‘‘rapidly
reconfigure their dynamical properties, switching between
different behaviors as the cognitive flow requires.’’ More-
over, a simple model has shown that this behavior can be
accounted for by a simple circuit that is modulated by an
external current, and this suggests that even the prefrontal
cortex may be driven by external modulation in different
processing modes.
The idea that the operation of a cortical area such as V1
is dependent on top-down control is one that can be gen-
eralized to all brain areas, and this mechanism has poten-
tial implications for understanding the mechanism of
behavioral disorders. Clearly, attentional influences have
been identified in numerous areas across the visual path-690 Neuron 54, June 7, 2007 ª2007 Elsevier Inc.way. Moreover, the observation that even in frontal cortex
the same neurons can be engaged in multiple tasks sug-
gests that such top-down modulation operates even at
the highest levels. Even in the hippocampus, which is
thought to encode information about short-term memo-
ries, there is evidence of top-down mechanisms at play
(Kentros et al., 2004). Other sensory systems, including
the auditory system, show task-dependent modification
of functional properties. In ferrets trained to do different
auditory tasks—either tone detection or frequency dis-
crimination—neurons in A1 responded differently to the
identical auditory stimulus, depending on the behavioral
context (Fritz et al., 2005).
We have argued that top-down control enables lower-
order cortical areas to encode information about more
complex stimulus attributes and that with learning there
is a shift in the representation of shape information from
higher- to lower-order areas. This raises the following
question: is there a privileged route by which this informa-
tion can access the decision-making apparatus, without
recapitulating representation of that information along
the entire pathway? If the shift in representation serves
to alter the cortical strategy for analyzing a stimulus for
more rapid and parallel processing, one would expect
that the result of the analysis by early visual areas would
get to the areas involved in the response without having
to be processed in intermediate areas. Again, the solution
here might be related to the process by which higher areas
query or send instruction to the lower areas, and to the is-
sue of where the top-down signal is coming from. Learning
would be a matter of associating the areas engaged with
making the decision with the areas in which the informa-
tion required for making the decision is represented.
Disruption in the Balance of Top-Down Control
in Psychiatric Disorders
The idea of dynamic cortical states and the role of top-
down influences in sensory processing have a potential
bearing on behavioral disorders. For instance, a failure
in a form of efference copy has been posited to underlie
certain positive symptoms of schizophrenia, including
auditory hallucinations and delusions of alien control
(Feinberg, 1978; Frith, 1992). A similar control mechanism
exists in the auditory system: auditory responses to
uttered speech are attenuated when compared to a play-
back of the same speech (Ford et al., 2001). This attenua-
tion is mediated by top-down connections between the
frontal lobes, where speech is generated to the temporal
lobes, where it is heard (Paus et al., 1996; Mrsic-Flogel
et al., 2005) and is absent in schizophrenic patients
(Ford et al., 2001), providing support for a theory of schizo-
phrenia that involves a disruption of these interactions
(Feinberg, 1978; Frith, 1992). According to this theory,
the lack of the efference copy in schizophrenic patients
precludes them from distinguishing self-generated from
externally generated percepts, and this may underlie pos-
itive symptoms such as auditory hallucinations, delusions,
or alien control (Feinberg, 1978; Frith, 1992). People
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that they themselves are generating as coming from an
alien source. Lacking the efference copy, however, they
are unable to identify these sounds as coming from them-
selves. The defective recognition of one’s own actions in
patients with schizophrenia is also manifested in visuomo-
tor control (Spence et al., 1997; Franck et al., 2001), sug-
gesting a modality-independent difficulty in monitoring
and recognizing self actions (Frith et al., 2000).
In addition to stabilizing the image during ocular move-
ments, efferent copy serves, during normal motor func-
tion, to simulate and correct motor plans. Thus, in a dys-
function of such a system two behaviors are expected:
(1) deficit in rapid error correction, which is based in the
possibility of predicting an action before it is made and,
and (2) difficulty coping with unexpected sensory feed-
back that requires a model of the expected feedback
from the motor action (Macaluso et al., 2000). Both deficits
are observed in patients with schizophrenia: they cannot
make rapid error corrections (Frith and Done, 1989) nor
cope with distortions of motor output, as evidenced by
the fact that they experience delusions when hearing their
own voice fed back at a different pitch (Cahill et al., 1996).
The theory that auditory hallucinations may result from
misattributed internally generated sounds is also sup-
ported by imaging studies performed during hallucinatory
episodes (Silbersweig et al., 1995; Shergill et al., 2000,
2004) that have shown the involvement of subcortical ac-
tivity as well as regions involved in speech generation and
auditory perception. Moreover, activation in the left infe-
rior frontal gyrus precedes the activation in the temporal
gyri, supporting the hypothesis that activation of sensory
areas is driven in a top-down fashion by regions mediating
the generation of inner speech (Shergill et al., 2004).
The corollary discharge dysfunction may reflect a more
generic deficit in top-down influences, reflecting what has
been proposed as a disconnection syndrome (Friston
et al., 1995; Friston, 2005). Indeed, a variety of experi-
ments have shown a consistent bias in performance defi-
cits: schizophrenic patients may elicit normal behavior in
tasks relying on bottom-up processing but are often im-
paired in tasks that rely heavily on top-down control. For
instance, in the masking paradigm (a stimulus is rendered
invisible by a mask), changing the order of the mask and
the stimulus yields different levels of top-down involve-
ment. Forward masking (the mask precedes the stimulus)
is based on retinal and cortical bottom-up mechanisms
(Saccuzzo et al., 1996), and backward masking involves
a dynamic competition between bottom-up and re-entrant
top-down flows of visual information processing (Di Lollo
et al., 2000; Enns, 2004). Schizophrenic patients show
a deficit in backward (Green et al., 1999; Dehaene et al.,
2003a) but not in forward masking (Saccuzzo et al.,
1996). A similar dissociation is observed in memory recall
paradigms, were schizophrenic patients show unimpaired
recollection of implicit memory, for example in stem-com-
pletion tasks (Gras-Vincendon et al., 1994; Huron et al.,
1995) but are impaired when explicit (conscious) recollec-tion is required (Huron et al., 1995; Kazes et al., 1999).
Thus, more generally, modulation of sensory or mnemonic
information by top-down or executive control seems to be
impaired in schizophrenia.
A key aspect of top-down influences in normal function
is their interaction with perceptual-learning and contextual
influences (Ito et al., 1998; Gilbert et al., 2001; Li et al.,
2004; Sigman and Dehaene, 2005), selecting relevant
information and acting as a modulator of plasticity. Inter-
estingly, this interaction between learning and top-down
influences seems to be particularly affected in schizophre-
nia (Friston et al., 1995; Friston, 2005). Schizophrenic pa-
tients manifest a difficulty in learning and representing be-
haviorally relevant percepts when the selection of relevant
information is determined by prior knowledge. This selec-
tion process involves activity of the medial frontal gyrus,
a region involved in top-down control (MacDonald et al.,
2005). On the other hand, the same patients have no
deficit in the same tasks when relevant information is con-
veyed by a distinctive physical property and thus can be
distinguished through bottom-up mechanisms (Silverstein
et al., 1996). In a contour-integration task, perceptual
learning, top-down effect, and their interaction can be
studied by performing the task in different presentation or-
ders: increasing difficulty or random order. In the increas-
ing difficulty order contour-detection thresholds are lower,
which is thought to indicate top-down influences (the con-
tour is easier to see once it has been seen) (Kovacs, 2000;
Li et al., 2006). Chronic schizophrenic patients show im-
paired learning and an interaction between learning and
presentation order manifesting reduced top-down influ-
ences in contour detection (Silverstein et al., 2006). This
finding is consistent with other observations indicating
that schizophrenic patients’ perceptual organization
breaks down as the elements to be grouped become
more distant or less symmetrical, seeming to imply more
generally a breakdown of Gestalt organizational pro-
cesses in schizophrenic patients (Shallice et al., 1991;
Frith, 1992; Silverstein and Uhlhaas, 2004).
Thus, numerous lines of evidence point to a functional
deficit of top-down control in schizophrenic patients.
Whether this can account for the entire pathophysiology
of the disease is of course by no means clear. It is worth
exploring, however, whether this reversal of the central
dogma of feedforward cortical processing in the develop-
ing concept of top-down influences may be important not
only in our understanding of the normal processing of sen-
sory information but in developing insights into the mech-
anisms underlying numerous behavioral disorders.
Conclusion
An increasing body of evidence, coming from many sour-
ces, points toward a model of sensory processing
whereby each cortical area acts as an adaptive processor,
undergoing state changes to execute different algorithms
depending on behavioral context. Under normal circum-
stances, each cortical state creates a set of expectations
for the subsequent state, and the top-down signal affectsNeuron 54, June 7, 2007 ª2007 Elsevier Inc. 691
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responses at all levels of processing reflect this conver-
gence between expectation and sensory evidence. This
considerably enriches the functional diversity of each
area and the kinds of information that each area conveys
to other areas. As a consequence, any given percept or
behavior corresponds to a state of interaction between
cortical areas, rather than to the activity of specific cortical
modules. We have proposed that this interaction is mani-
fest in the way that feedback connections address sub-
sets of intrinsic cortical connections, and the functional
properties of a neuron depend on which subset is gated
at any given time. The mechanism of perceptual learning
may involve the setting up of this addressing, such that
both the encoding and recall of learned information in-
volves the appropriate selection of the inputs that convey
information about the stimulus being discriminated. This
theory of cortical interaction may prove useful in under-
standing the mechanisms underlying both normal brain
function and behavioral disorders.
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